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RISK IN THE REPUBLIC
JONATHAN BAERT WIENER*
The Cummings Colloquia on Environmental Law at Duke University were launched in 1996 by a generous gift in honor of Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr., and by the leadership of Dean Norman L. Christensen of Duke’s Nicholas School of the Environment and Dean
Pamela B. Gann of Duke Law School. The mission of these annual
Colloquia is simple but ambitious: to bring together diverse disciplines to confront the most difficult intellectual and practical challenges in environmental law and policy.
The first of the Cummings Colloquia, held in April 1996, addressed the challenge posed to environmental law by the “new ecology”: the rejection by ecologists of the static “balance of nature”
equilibrium paradigm, and its replacement with a new non-equilib1
rium paradigm in which nature is seen as perpetually in flux.
The second Cummings Colloquium, held in November 1996, is
the subject of this symposium issue. At this gathering we examined
the growing importance of comparing risks as the basis for setting
* Associate Professor, Law School and Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University; President-Elect, Society for Risk Analysis, Research Triangle Chapter (SRA-RTC); and
Director, Cummings Colloquia on Environmental Law at Duke University. My work on this
essay was supported by the Eugene T. Bost, Jr. Research Professorship of the Charles A. Cannon Charitable Trust No. 3. I thank Cass Sunstein and Jim Hammitt for insightful comments
on a prior draft of this essay. I am very grateful to Bruce Allen, Chris Frey, Jim Hammitt,
Linda Steckley, Brad Bodager, Rhonda Finnerty, and especially Julie Covach for helping to
organize this Colloquium. Further thanks go to the 1996-97 Cummings Fellows in Environmental Law, Jonathan Cosco and Kerry Stroupe, for assisting in all aspects of the Colloquium;
to Lisa Schnabel, a Duke Law student, who assisted in administering the comparative risk survey at the Colloquium; and to the editors and staff of the Duke Environmental Law and Policy
Forum, who worked so hard to bring these papers to publication.
1. See Symposium, Beyond the Balance of Nature: Environmental Law Faces the New
Ecology, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLICY FORUM 1 (1996).
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environmental policy priorities. First, we asked how diverse risks
should be compared. Not comparing risks – setting priorities without
regard to the importance of one risk relative to another – is to compare implicitly and most likely arbitrarily. There is no escaping some
kind of comparative perspective. But the methods and procedures
employed in comparative risk analysis (CRA) can substantially affect
2
the outcome of such analysis. The Colloquium examined what can
be learned from current applications of comparative risk analysis at
the federal, state and local levels. It sought practical insights into
how our methods of CRA can be improved.
Second, we addressed how government can and should engage in
setting priorities using CRA when there is deep divergence about the
basis on which risks should be compared. Experts and the public ap3
pear to evaluate risks on quite different criteria. Why, for example,
does the public appear to rank hazardous waste sites as a serious risk
while ranking indoor radon as a low risk, and rank nuclear power as a
serious risk while ranking medical x-rays as a low risk, whereas in
4
each case experts say the opposite? Is this because the public is mistaken about the quantitative facts, or is it because the public’s value
judgments depend on qualitative attributes of these risks ignored by
experts? In the face of such divergence between expert and public
evaluation of risks, how should a democratic republic set intelligent
priorities to protect health and the environment: should it cater to
public views, follow expert judgments, or craft some combination of
the two?
To try to answer these questions, the Cummings Colloquium on
Environmental Law, in partnership with the Society for Risk Analy2. See COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: TOOLS FOR SETTING GOVERNMENT
PRIORITIES (J. Clarence Davies ed., 1996). Even critics of CRA agree that some form of comparison is inevitable and that it must be done constructively; they object to a purely quantitative version of CRA that omits attention to qualitative attributes. See Donald T. Hornstein,
Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992); Donald T. Hornstein, Paradigms, Process, and Politics: Risk and
Regulatory Design, in WORST THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES 147 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding, eds., 1994).
3. See the essays by Ann Bostrom and Howard Margolis in this symposium issue.
4. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 21 & Table 4, 34 & Table 6 (1993) (citing studies by EPA and by Paul
Slovic). Citing EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987), Breyer reports that the public ranks hazardous waste sites #1
whereas experts rank them “medium-to-low,” and the public ranks indoor radon #25 whereas
experts rank it “high.” Id. at 21 & Table 4. Citing Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE
280, 281 (1987), Breyer reports that the public ranks nuclear power #1 whereas experts rank it
#20, and the public ranks x-rays #22 whereas experts rank it #7. Id. at 34 & Table 6.
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sis, Research Triangle Chapter (SRA-RTC), brought together risk
analysts, physicians, toxicologists, epidemiologists, decision theorists,
psychologists, government officials, political scientists, economists,
ethicists, legal scholars, and the invited public to engage in a two-day
discussion and debate.
I. CRA IN ACTION
A. Macro Applications
After welcoming remarks by John Strohbehn, the Provost of
Duke University, and Norm Christensen, the Dean of the Nicholas
School of the Environment, the Colloquium began with presentations
by Gail Charnley, Executive Director of the U.S. Commission on
Risk Assessment and Risk Management, and Thomas Grumbly, Under Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy, on current U.S.
government efforts to improve and apply CRA. Dr. Charnley emphasized the increasing recognition that comparison of risks is inescapable, leading the Congress to launch her Commission with the
charge of advising the nation on the best ways to conduct and improve risk analysis and risk policy. The Commission’s two-volume
report was just about to be released as our Colloquium convened.
She previewed its findings, notably that whereas our scientific and legal institutions have tended to treat risks one at a time, in fact we live
in a “multi-risk” environment: multiple exposures to multiple substances associated with multiple kinds of risks. The Commission
therefore is urging much greater attention to the potential synergies
among these risk factors, to the need to make difficult trade-offs
among interrelated risks, and to the need for improved methods of
comparing diverse risks.
Secretary Grumbly, a longtime proponent of CRA in numerous
federal positions and in the private sector, described his agency’s efforts to bring a comparative risk approach to the dismantling and
5
cleanup of the nation’s nuclear weapons facilities. Grumbly detailed
the difficult choices involved in managing both the environmental
risks of these facilities, including the transport and disposal of contaminated materials, and the security risks of the materials stored at
these facilities. He argued that the environmental risks of nuclear
wastes need to be managed assiduously, but that the security risks are

5. See his remarks in this issue.
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also environmental risks: as he put it, “one rogue nuclear weapon can
ruin your whole day.”
A central theme of both Charnley and Grumbly’s remarks was
the need to involve both expert and public input in risk policymaking.
Democracy is enhanced when the public is well informed by expert
analysis. Expert analysis is enhanced when experts take account of
6
the insights and values of non-experts. At the same time, Charnley
and Grumbly put their fingers on a pivotal ambiguity: Who is the
“public”? Charnley’s call for greater involvement of “stakeholders”
was met with concerns among the audience that this strategy would
be just another route for well-organized special interests to influence
and distort risk policy. Grumbly favored involving “citizens” rather
than “stakeholders”, but it remained unclear how millions of affected
7
citizens could effectively participate in particular risk policy choices.
The afternoon sessions focused on the “macro” use of CRA to
rank numerous risks facing society as a priority-setting device. Ken
Jones of the Green Mountain Institute for Environmental Democracy and Debra Gutenson of U.S. EPA discussed developments in
8
the use of CRA by states and localities. Both argued that CRA can
be a very useful undertaking for states and cities trying to allocate
limited budgets to diverse health and environmental challenges.
Both emphasized the role of CRA as a process, not just an outcome:
the involvement of affected parties in the CRA exercise can help
clarify facts and options and can improve the parties’ satisfaction with
(and hence loyalty to) the policy decisions made thereafter.
Jennifer Crawford, a student at the Nicholas School of the Environment at Duke, presented her research comparing the large-scale
CRA exercises conducted to date, including the EPA’s Unfinished
Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems
(1987), the EPA Science Advisory Board’s Reducing Risk: Setting
Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection (1990), and the
st
State of California’s Toward the 21 Century: Planning for the Protection of California’s Environment (1994). Crawford observed that
these exercises reflected varying approaches to involving “the public”
6. Indeed, advocates of expertise in risk policy fully expect and desire that decisions will
be made democratically. See BREYER, supra note 4, at 73-78; Alice M. Rivlin, Rationalism and
Redemocratization: Time for a Truce, in WORST THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISKBASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES, supra note 2, at 21, 23-26.
7. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (political voice systematically over-represents organized groups’
special interests and under-represents citizens’ diffuse general interests).
8. See their essays in this issue.
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in the risk evaluation process. She also observed that although the
EPA/SAB 1990 report had urged the ranking of “risk reduction opportunities” (policy actions) rather than only of baseline risks, so far
9
none of the macro CRA exercises had engaged in this effort.
B. Micro Applications
These analyses of macro CRA exercises were followed by even
more detailed discussions of several “micro” CRA studies: compari10
sons of interrelated risks involved in a specific policy choice. David
Matchar of the Center for Health Policy Research & Education at
Duke presented results of a study of a stroke prevention surgical
therapy (carotid endarterectomy) that clears out occluded blood vessels leading to the brain. Compared to standard non-surgical medical
care, carotid endarterectomy surgery substantially reduces the risk of
stroke, but also slightly increases the risk of a sudden fatal hemorrhage. For patients showing symptoms of likely stroke, this new
therapy would extend their predicted life span; but for asymptomatic
patients, this therapy might reduce their net expected life span because the increased risk of hemorrhage would outweigh the reduced
risk of stroke. Matchar then asked prospective patients about their
evaluations of these risks. Interestingly, Matchar reported, many of
the prospective patients he surveyed ranked instant death as qualitatively preferable to permanent stroke-induced disability (such as full
paralysis or vegetative state), so that the risky surgical therapy could
be preferred by patients even where it would not extend (or even
where it would reduce somewhat) the quantitative number of expected years of life.
Robert Tardiff of EA Engineering (and a former President of
the SRA) presented the evidence on drinking water safety, comparing chemical disease risks (such as liver disease, kidney disease, and
cancer) to microbial disease risks (such as gastrointestinal illnesses
like diarrhea and cholera). Both kinds of risks can cause disabilities
and death. Tardiff observed that the chemically-induced risks tend to
be latent (occurring decades after exposure), occur in roughly one
out of every one million persons exposed to contaminated water, and
are predicted with low statistical confidence. The microbial risks, by
9. See her essay in this issue.
10. Often these risk pairs are linked in a risk-risk tradeoff, such that efforts to reduce one
risk would induce increases in the other risk. In such cases, some way of comparing and
weighing the risks is essential. See RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds., 1995).
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contrast, tend to be acute (occurring hours to days after exposure),
occur in roughly one out of every one thousand persons exposed to
contaminated drinking water, and are predicted with high statistical
confidence. These divergent attributes make these two kinds of risks
difficult to compare. Meanwhile, however, these dissimilar risks occur simultaneously and interdependently: disinfectant chemicals such
as chlorine are purposefully added to drinking water in order to reduce microbial risks. Hence comparison of these risks is essential if
society is to achieve optimal protection of drinking water that mini11
mizes the combined risk. On a quantitative basis, Tardiff argued,
the microbial risks are more serious, and proposals to curtail chlorination of drinking water in order to reduce chemical risks may only
12
invite a larger increase in microbial risks. But in addition to the
quantitative magnitude of the chemical and microbial risks, there
may be differences in how people evaluate the qualitative attributes
of these risks. For example, people might be more worried about
long-term chemically-induced cancer than about acute microbiallyinduced gastrointestinal disease; and this view might be a factual mistake or a considered value choice.
Chris Frey of North Carolina State University presented a model
of the health and environmental effects of acid rain. He argued that
the risks of acid rain are diverse – including human mortality, human
disease, damages to aquatic resources, and reductions in visibility –
and that different policy options would yield different combinations
of these risks. Thus, an integrated assessment model is required to
evaluate these multiple risks in concert.
C. Improving CRA
The session concluded with thought on improving CRA, offered
by Lester Lave of Carnegie Mellon University (a former President of
the SRA) and by James Hammitt of the Harvard School of Public
Health. Lave furnished a broad critique of current methods of risk
assessment, such as the choice of animal species used in bioassays and
the use of worst-case upper bounds, arguing that these methods may
yield estimates that are “precisely wrong” rather than “vaguely right”
– estimates that are sometimes “completely useless” and “so bad you
11. See Susan Putnam & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Seeking Safe Drinking Water, in RISK
RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10,
at 124.
12. As Tardiff noted, other disinfectants might be used instead of chlorine, and their risks
need evaluation. See Putnam & Wiener, supra note 11.

VERSUS
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wouldn’t use them.” He urged that EPA reform its cancer risk assessment guidelines to focus on the distribution of risk rather than
the upper bound. He also argued that risk ranking exercises involving the public in CRA are essential. In particular, he stressed the encouraging results that he and colleagues have observed with
“informed citizen juries” – groups of lay citizens educated about the
facts and then asked to deliberate about risk rankings.
Hammitt offered several suggestions for improving CRA. He
urged that future CRA exercises rank not only baseline risks, but also
risk reduction options. This is important because different options
entail different benefits and different costs. Some “large” risks may
be relatively intractable, whereas great progress might be made
against some “medium” or “small” risks. He also urged attention to
the expected value of risk reduction, incorporating uncertainties into
13
risks and risk reduction options.
II. EXPLAINING DIVERGENT RISK EVALUATIONS
A. Experts vs. Public
Dean Pamela Gann of Duke Law School opened the second day
of the Colloquium. The first session confronted the basic difficulty in
CRA: whose risk comparisons count? Ann Bostrom of the School of
Public Policy at Georgia Tech surveyed the “psychometric” research
seeking to explain why experts and the public evaluate risks so differ14
ently. This research, she observed, does indicate that members of
the public are often incompletely informed about the factual parameters of risks, and moreover that they often make heuristic errors in
their perceptions of risks. These factual and cognitive errors may
yield systematic over-estimation of small risks. But, Bostrom argued,
the psychometric research also shows that informed and careful lay
citizens still evaluate risks differently from the purely quantitative
15
approach ascribed to experts. The leading hypothesis explaining
these citizens’ risk evaluations is that the public assigns importance to
a series of qualitative attributes of risks, including the degree of
dread associated with the risk, its unfamiliarity, its uncertainty, its
16
unnaturalness, its inequity, and other attributes. These qualitative
13. See his essay Improving Comparative Risk Analysis in this issue.
14. See her essay in this issue.
15. She also noted that experts are not purely quantitative number-crunchers; they also
bring their own values, leanings and cognitive approaches to risk evaluations.
16. See Slovic, supra note 4; K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY (1991);
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factors could explain some of the public’s preference for expensive
environmental protection measures aimed at quantitatively small but
qualitatively worrisome risks (such as cancer from synthetic chemicals and nuclear power plants), and its neglect of more inexpensive
opportunities to reduce quantitatively large but qualitatively mundane risks (such as automobile accidents, radon in homes, and mi17
crobes in water).
Howard Margolis of the Harris School of Public Policy at the
University of Chicago countered that this “usual story” does not, in
his view, adequately explain the observed divergence between expert
18
and public evaluations of risk. He argued that qualitative accounts
of public risk perceptions are more often post hoc rationalizations
than true causal explanations. That is, he argued, people find Risk A
more worrisome than Risk B for unconscious reasons, and then construct a qualitative account only when pressed to justify their choice.
Margolis argued that these unconscious reasons have more to do with
whether people are thinking about the full consequences of a risk
choice – the benefits and costs of trying to reduce the risk – than with
whether the risk is especially dread or not. It may be that people
rank chemical carcinogens as a more serious risk than automobiles or
indoor radon, for example, not because of qualitative dread of the
former, but because people are especially likely to ignore the diffuse
downsides of restricting synthetic chemicals (e.g., outbreaks of waterborne microbial illnesses) whereas they are likely to consider the persona downsides of restricting the sources of more mundane risks
(e.g., curtailing their automobile travel, or having to retrofit their
homes to vent indoor radon).
B. Quantities, Qualities, and the “Willingness to Sacrifice”
James Hammitt of Harvard reported the results of the risk19
ranking exercise completed by the Colloquium attendees. In advance of the Colloquium, I had thought it would be interesting to
survey the attendees about their own risk perceptions, and asked Jim
to design and administer the study. In particular, I was interested in
Clayton P. Gilette & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027
(1990).
17. See, e.g., George Tolley et al., State-of-the-Art Health Values, in VALUING HEALTH
FOR POLICY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 323, 339-44 (George Tolley et al., eds., 1994) (people
appear to value avoiding death by cancer several times more than they value avoiding an equal
quantitative likelihood of death by automobile accident).
18. See his essay in this issue.
19. See his essay Comparative Risk Analysis: an Informal Survey of Experts in this issue.
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whether the qualitative attributes hypothesized to explain risk perceptions could be measured quantitatively. One way to measure
these attributes would be to ask survey respondents their financial
willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid selected hypothetical increments
20
of the qualitative attributes. But there is some evidence that survey
respondents have difficulty translating the value of risk reduction increments into dollar terms, and this difficulty may be heightened
when it is just the qualitative attribute of a risk that respondents are
21
being asked to monetize. Therefore, I thought it might be more
successful to ask respondents to translate qualitative attributes of risk
into risk units – into the additional quantity of risk (e.g. number of
additional lives) they would be willing to sacrifice in order to avoid
the undesirable qualitative characteristic, or put another way, the
number of additional lives needed to be lost from the qualitatively
more benign risk in order to make respondents judge the two risks as
equally important. This “willingness to sacrifice” (WTS) measure is
in effect a measure of the opportunity cost of avoiding qualitative attributes of risk: if the public chooses to invest in reducing qualitative
attributes of risk, it is giving up some quantitative degree of risk that
could otherwise have been avoided. But how much? How many
lives would one sacrifice to avoid a risk that is incrementally more
22
dread or unfamiliar?
20. See, e.g., Tolley, supra note 17; Robin Gregory & Sarah Lichtenstein, A Hint of Risk:
Tradeoffs Between Quantitative and Qualitative Risk Factors, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 199 (1994);
Timothy L. McDaniels et al., Risk Perception and the Value of Safety, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 495
(1992); Ian Savage, An Empirical Investigation into the Effect of Psychological Perception on
the Willingness-to-Pay to Reduce Risk, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 75 (1993); W. Kip Viscusi,
Wes Magat, & Joel Huber, Pricing Environmental Health Risks: Survey Assessments of Riskand Risk-Dollar Trade-offs for Chronic Bronchitis, 21 J. ENVTL. ECON. AND MGMT. 32 (1991).
The observed risk premia (compensating wage differentials) actually demanded by workers to
face higher risks on the job are presumably also sensitive to the qualitative attributes associated
with different risks, but the literature on worker risk premia does not appear to have attempted
to distinguish and measure the WTP for these qualitative attributes. See W. KIP VISCUSI,
FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 51-74 (1992).
21. See Gregory & Lichtenstein, supra note 20; Viscusi et al., supra note 20.
22. Previous efforts developing measures of the tradeoff between risk quantities and risk
qualities include Gregory & Lichtenstein, supra note 20, and MAUREEN L. CROPPER & UMA
SUBRAMANIAN, PUBLIC CHOICES BETWEEN LIFESAVING PROGRAMS: HOW IMPORTANT ARE
LIVES SAVED? (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1497, August 1995).
But Gregory & Lichtenstein only compared the number of deaths or injuries needed to warrant
a new technology (bicycle brakes or plastic cars) by two groups of respondents, one presented
with a qualitative description and the other not, rather than asking each respondent to indicate
along a sliding scale the incremental number of lives saved that would justify incremental increases in the qualitative attribute. Cropper and Subramanian did ask for the incremental lives
that would need to be saved to warrant facing a qualitative attribute, but studied only voluntariness, controllability, seriousness, and personal impact, and did not focus on qualitative at-
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Hammitt presents the questions asked and the results of our
WTS survey in his second paper in this issue. Among the most interesting findings of our efforts is that, at least for the comparison between smoking prevention and air pollution control, our sample of
experts attending the workshop generated much lower WTS estimates than the sample of public respondents surveyed by Cropper
and Subramanian. In other words, the expert sample appeared to
care more about risk qualities than did the public sample. Our sample also preferred nuclear power to coal-generated electricity when
the quantitative risks were assumed to be twice as high for coal as for
nuclear (in reality the ratio may be much higher); given the qualitative dread often associated with nuclear power, presumably a public
sample would have a high willingness to sacrifice lives from coal in
order to avoid nuclear power. As to automobile airbags, when instructed to assume that airbags kill 10 children for every 300 adults
saved (which now seems lower than the real ratio), our sample reported that it would be willing to sacrifice between 10 and 275 children for every 300 adults saved. Here both the number of years of
life lost (e.g., 80 for children versus 40 for adults) and the qualitative
attributes of risk would presumably weigh more heavily toward saving children. It is surprising that 10% of the respondents equated
more than 200 children lost with 300 adults lost. Hammitt observed
that our survey respondents appeared to underweight not only the
qualitative attributes or risk, but even some quantitative attributes as
well (such as years of life lost); he worried that the results seemed
driven by a compulsion to minimize the number of premature fatalities regardless of the context or the age of the victim.
III. SHOULD COMPARATIVE RISK ANALYSIS GUIDE RISK POLICY?
The penultimate session addressed the impact that CRA should
have on policy outcomes – on regulation and budget allocation.
Should Congress, the President, and/or states impose an overarching
rule that regulation and budgets be re-targeted based on CRA? How
would such a rule be defined and enforced? John Graham of the
Harvard School of Public Health (and the President of SRA) presented an overview of risk legislation moving through the Congress.
He noted that agencies are being asked to perform a number of different kinds of analyses, including risk assessment, cost-effectiveness
analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and CRA. While he favored the use of
more careful risk analysis, Graham cautioned that piling on the numtributes such as dread, unfamiliarity and unnaturalness.
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ber and kind of analyses required, without providing agencies the resources to conduct these analyses, could overload agencies and begin
to diminish their ability to produce even those regulations that would
pass all of these analytic tests (and hence provide a net benefit to society). He therefore urged that agencies be furnished additional
funding as they are obliged to perform additional analyses. And
Graham argued that the most important use of CRA may not be
within agencies, but across the government as a whole – across agencies, across statutes, and across Congressional committees – because
it is the misallocation of priorities across the entire government that
yields the greatest lost opportunities for more effective health and
environmental protection.
IV. SHOULD PUBLIC VALUES GUIDE RISK POLICY?
The final session returned to the question of the conflict between
expert and public approaches to risk evaluation. The central problem
is the role of democracy in risk policy. Given the divergence between
expert and public evaluations of risk, how should government regulate? If the public is making factual and cognitive errors, how can
government simultaneously represent both the public’s current views,
and the public’s best interests? Alternatively, if the public is expressing different value choices about different risks, how can democratic government not adhere to the public’s views?
A standard prescription is that regulators should ignore citizens’
misunderstandings of fact, while adhering to citizens’ value choices
about risks. But it may be very difficult to distinguish which is which.
And certain of these democratic “value” choices might even be questioned by a progressive republic as inconsistent with principles of liberty and tolerance. If so, what criteria should guide regulators in
“filtering” public attitudes?
Frank Cross of the University of Texas argued that even if public
evaluations of risks are driven by value choices rather than by factual
and cognitive errors, it is not the duty of a republic to cater blindly to
those value choices. He argued that public values may be prejudicial
and that, in other areas of public policy, the republic treats such values as illegitimate or at least as worthy of enlightened moderation.
For example, an aversion to what seems “dread” and “unfamiliar,”
when expressed in immigration policy as to foreigners, is treated as
an ill-considered intolerance requiring filtering or rejection before it
becomes public policy. Dread of unfamiliar (but quantitatively
small) risks may reflect similar intolerant prejudice, whether it is
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dread of a new energy source like nuclear power being introduced in
place of a familiar source like coal. Distaste for “unnatural” risks
(such as nuclear power, chlorination of drinking water, recombinant
DNA biotechnology, and purposive interbreeding of dwindling species) juxtaposed with acceptance of risks seen as “natural” (such as
indoor radon, microbial infestation of drinking water, classic crossbreeding biotechnology, and letting species dwindle) may also reflect
a fictitious ideological distinction that invites an increase in real envi23
ronmental harm.
Cass Sunstein of the University of Chicago had previously written that government risk regulation should in general reflect public
24
values regarding risk. However, he had also written that, in some
circumstances, observed private choices in the market domain are an
unreliable basis for policy (because, for example, citizens’ choices are
impaired by market imperfections such as limited information and
limited mobility) and that government should be understood as a de25
liberative process of shaping rather than reflecting public attitudes.
At the Colloquium, he argued for a system of weighting life-years
saved according to whether they involve suffering (proxied, he argued, by dread) and inequity – a system of maximizing “decently liv26
able life years.” He urged that invidious prejudices and heuristic errors be rejected as qualitative grounds for risk evaluation by
progressive republican government.
Moreover, he questioned
whether the qualitative attributes of “involuntariness” and
“controllability” are sound normative bases for regulatory distinctions, because categorizing a risk as relatively involuntary or uncontrollable only means that it is relatively more costly to control – a
finding that goes to whether government should intervene, but not to
27
whether the risk is qualitatively more troublesome. A risk is involuntary or uncontrollable only in the sense that it would be very difficult (i.e. costly) to avoid the risk. A risk is voluntary or controllable
23. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POLICY FORUM 1 (1997).
24. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing The Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 62 (1995) (“when the differences [in risk evaluation] arise from clashes between
the value frameworks of experts and laypeople … there is no reason to defer to experts; democracies should be responsive to the informed values of their citizens.”).
25. See Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1991).
26. See Cass R. Sunstein, Which Risks First? 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM (forthcoming
1997) (on file with U. CHI. L. REV.). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 259 (1997).
27. See his essay in this symposium issue. See also Sunstein, Which Risks First?, supra
note 26.
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only in the sense that it would be easy (i.e. less costly) for individuals
to choose to avoid it. Indeed, it would be double-counting to consider controllability/voluntariness both as an extra benefit of risk control (which is how it is typically treated in the risk perceptions literature, as an added dimension of risk) and as a measure of the cost of
risk control (which is what it really amounts to, in Sunstein’s view).
V. THE PRINCE AND THE PAUPER?
The debate about public versus expert evaluation of risk is part
of a long and large debate about the best basis for all public policy –
28
for all law. In a representative system of government, do those in
power best serve democracy by reflecting the views of the citizenry,
or by exercising judgment and leadership that educates the public to
see things in a different way? Besides the practical reality that representatives must stand for re-election, are there any normative parameters to cabin the exercise of such public-spirited leadership, lest
it become antidemocratic opportunism, especially given the public’s
limited ability to supervise its agents in government?
Thomas Jefferson appears to have articulated the former, preference-reflecting approach. He said: “I know of no safe repository of
the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves; and if we
think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a
wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to
29
inform their discretion by education.” In other words, the Prince
should not run off on his own agenda when the Pauper, if informed,
would choose a different course. Edmund Burke appears to have endorsed the latter, preference-shaping approach. Said he: “Your Representative owes you, not only his industry, but his judgment; and he
30
betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”
28. Public (majoritarian) vs. expert (rationalist) control of government was at the heart of
the debate over the structure of the American Constitution, and of the compromise of checks
and balances fashioned by Madison. See William Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988).
29. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Mr. Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 177 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854). See also THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to
Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: MEMORIAL
EDITION 32, 33 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904) (“[G]overnments are
republican only in proportion as they embody the will of the people, and execute it.”). But see
JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE AMERICAN SPHINX (1997) (arguing that Jefferson was not as pure a
populist as is often assumed).
30. EDMUND BURKE, Speech at the Conclusion of the Poll, Nov. 3, 1774, in 3 THE
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 64, 69 (W.M. Elofson & John A. Woods eds.,
1996). There is room for agreement between these pronouncements of Jefferson and Burke;
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In other words, the Prince may best represent the Pauper not by catering mechanically to the Pauper’s current expressed preferences,
but by deploying on the Pauper’s behalf the Prince’s best understanding of the issues and their resolution, and helping the Pauper to
see the issues accordingly. The democratic Prince is not a potted
plant.
Surely both Jefferson and Burke are right to some degree. Elections force representative political agents to be faithful to some de31
gree to their public principals – principals who may desire and reward a complex mixture of both preference-reflecting and
32
preference-shaping behavior. Meanwhile, however, the principalagent disjunction in politics enables representatives to escape some
public review and thereby to serve concentrated constituencies or
their own viewpoints rather than maximizing public well-being
33
(however measured). The public’s perceptions of risk are surely
impaired to some degree by market imperfections (such as incom34
plete information and limited mobility) and to some degree by heuristic failures to consider risks clearly and to weigh both dangers and
35
opportunities. Meanwhile, educating the public about risks seems
obligatory and may be helpful, but it is a long-term and potentially
36
arduous strategy.
Risk regulation in a democratic republic confronts hard choices.
In our republic, representatives are not Princes, and citizens are not
Paupers; indeed every “expert” is also a citizen, and the citizenry is
for example, both might agree that the best instrumental method of “informing the public’s
discretion” would be for government officials to demonstrate enlightened leadership that, although it diverges from current public opinion, prompts reflection and shapes a new and better
public opinion. Cf. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 10-16
(1990) (successful representatives do not just reflect current public views, but respond to, and
help shape, citizens’ “potential preferences”).
31. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
32. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, supra note 30; Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice:
Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1991);
ARTHUR MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1983); MARC K. LANDY & MARTIN
A. LEVIN, THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY (1995); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of
Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 363 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
33. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); James Q. Wilson,
supra note 32, at 366-372; JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 327-45 (1973);
WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971);
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II (1989).
34. See Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, supra note 24.
35. See BREYER, supra note 4, at 35-38; Howard Margolis’s essay in this symposium issue;
Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990). See supra text accompanying note 18.
36. See BREYER, supra note 4, at 39.
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the source of government’s ultimate authority. The real question is
what representation means. If public evaluations are based on factual mistakes or heuristic errors, the solution might be for experts to
educate the public (Jefferson), or by contrast to insulate risk policy
decisions from the foibles of populist politics (Breyer). If public
evaluations are instead based on different value choices, the solution
may be to adhere to those value choices and override expert opinion
(Jefferson), or by contrast, to exercise wise, expert leadership by
shaping public attitudes (Burke).
This matrix presents choices that are difficult enough already.
But the complicating irony is that, like the Prince and the Pauper, the
“expert” and “public” approaches to risk regulation switch places!
As the story begins, the “expert” approach is seen as quantitative and technocratic, the domain of policy wonks who crunch risk
data and perform cost-benefit analysis. The “public” approach is
seen as qualitative and populist, the domain of communities and the
psychologists who study them.
But as the tale unfolds, the approaches put on each other’s
clothing. In a very real way, the “expert” approach is quite populist,
and the “public” approach might actually be elitist. This is not nonsensical. Consider that the “expert” approach employs cost-benefit
analysis to judge whether risk control is worth the expense. In order
to measure the benefits side of this calculus, the expert must gather
risk assessment data – the units of risk (say, life-years lost) associated
with each unit of exposure to the hazard. So far this is quantitative
and austere. But then the expert economist must translate those risk
figures into “benefits” – into some measure of the value of avoiding a
37
unit of risk. Hence, economists “monetize” risk avoidance estimates by applying a valuation measure such as the public’s willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid an increment of risk or its willingness to
38
accept (WTA) to incur the risk. These WTP and WTA numbers
implicitly and inescapably incorporate the public’s reactions to the
diverse qualitative attributes of risks. When the worker demands a
certain wage premium to face an occupational hazard, or the consumer pays a premium to purchase a safer product, or the survey re-

37. Approaches that seek to maximize the number of lives saved, or of life-years saved, or
some other purely physical measure of risk, do not involve benefits valuations, and may be
criticized for their failure to link risk data to public evaluations of the different qualitative contexts surrounding different risks. In economic terms, the maximand is the utility of risk reduction, not the physical units of risk reduction.
38. See W. KIP VISCUSI, supra note 20, at 19-21.
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spondent bids a price to avoid species loss, in each case she is responding to the risk in its totality and in its qualitative context. The
observed WTP or WTA reflects all the quantitative and qualitative
features of those risks in concert (albeit in a single aggregated measure that does not elucidate which, or to what degree, qualitative attributes are driving the public’s valuations, and that is sensitive to
39
market or survey imperfections). The “expert” engaged in such a
cost-benefit analysis is thus applying a fundamentally public metric of
risk. The Prince is seeing life as the Pauper does.
Meanwhile, the psychometric characterization of public attitudes
toward risk could be seen as an elite imputation of views to an unassuming public. If it is true that the public really does respond to
qualitative aspects – dread, unfamiliarity, involuntariness, inequity,
unnaturalness, trust, and so on – in comparing risks, then the public is
being populist, as alleged. But efforts to find the public expressly articulating the importance of these qualitative attributes have been in40
conclusive. Instead, the public’s appreciation for these qualitative
attributes has often been inferred by expert psychologists from the
indirect evidence that the public is ranking some risks higher than
others. The experts then examine the features of the risks being
ranked and infer that the qualitative attributes noticed by the experts
41
are what is driving the public’s evaluations. This is what Margolis
39. Applying a one-size-fits all measure of the average value of risk avoidance, such as,
say, valuing benefits at $5 million per statistical life saved regardless of the source or setting of
the health risk, would obscure the different qualitative factors and different value choices embedded in different risk contexts. Employing more finely disaggregated values of risk avoidance, thereby matching the context of the observed marketplace choice or contingent valuation
survey question to the context of the risk policy being examined by the expert, would yield a
more qualitatively accurate risk valuation. See VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH, supra note 17.
40. E.g., CROPPER & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 22, at 31-32, found that the median respondent traded a life for a life regardless of the qualitative variations. They did find, however,
that 20% of the respondents placed nearly infinite importance on the qualitative attributes, refusing to trade any number of quantitative lives to incur the qualitative attributes.
41. This positivist inference confronts the problem of nonfalsifiability. It is a bit like the
approach of observing legislative outcomes, separately observing that certain industry groups
benefited from the legislation, and then inferring that these industry groups must have been the
key political force driving the adoption of the legislation. Maybe, but maybe not – other variables could have explained the legislative outcome. See Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives
on the Politics of Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1253, 1276-1277
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (“[T]he empirical studies surveyed here
are broadly consistent with, but do not really prove, the political theory of regulation … [There
is] the lurking danger of tautology [because it] is impossible to imagine that regulation could be
imposed without redistributing income. Hence, a look for winners in the process … is virtually
certain to succeed.”). Likewise, it is virtually certain that in hindsight we will be able to point
to qualitative differences among differently ranked risks, but that does not necessarily mean
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calls the “usual story.” If Margolis is right (and he may not be) that
this inference about risk perceptions is a post-hoc rationalization –
just an explanation offered by experts for what is really something
else (say, irrational and heuristic errors by public respondents, or
perhaps some other qualitative values which have not yet been pinpointed by psychologists) – then the “public” approach to risk
evaluation turns out to be an elite expert construct. If so, the public
does not compare risks based on dread and unfamiliarity; rather, the
experts impute these views to a public that is thinking about some42
The Pauper is just being
thing else (or just making mistakes).
dressed up by the Prince.
In many risk evaluation settings, then, the Prince and the Pauper
may have switched roles: the expert economist is reflecting public
risk valuations, whereas the purportedly public attitudes regarding
qualitative risk attributes may be an expert gloss. If so – and here I
suggest only the plausibility of this role reversal, not its widespread
occurrence – the current debate about “expert” versus “public” approaches to risk regulation is missing the mark. Expert risk analysts
performing cost-benefit analysis are not ignoring the public; they are
listening. But experts interpreting public risk evaluations may be imputing more than they are hearing.
Or, at least, the economic and psychometric experts are both listening to the public, each in a different way. So there are really two
expert approaches to interpreting the public, rather than one cloistered
expert approach and one inclusive public approach.
Recognizing this irony does not answer the normative questions
regarding whether the republic should try to reflect or to shape public
attitudes about risk. It does suggest that there is far less separating
the “expert” and “public” approaches than is commonly asserted. It
does suggest that the normative questions about the preferencereflecting or preference-shaping role of government are far more
important than is the strawperson conflict between contrived
“expert” and “public” approaches. If government should play a preference-shaping role, subject to electoral system checks (that is, the
voters’ ability to unseat the incumbent whose leadership has strayed

that the qualitative differences account for the variations in public concern. Margolis’s concern
is that other variables could explain the observed public responses to diverse risks, besides the
qualitative attributes noticed after the fact by experts.
42. See Howard Margolis’s essay in this symposium issue; HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING
WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
(1996).
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too far), then the premium is on developing and communicating a
43
normative theory of ideal risk evaluations.
Before concluding that preference-shaping is the proper role for
government, we might begin to sketch such a normative theory of
ideal risk evaluations, to see what it would look like before we are
committed to it. In the table below, I try to find a reconciliation between the “expert” and “public” approaches that highlights their
shared normative premises. I pair the psychometric qualitative attributes of “complete” risk perception, on the left, with the economist’s conditions for “efficient” risk valuation in benefits estimation
(i.e., valuations under efficient conditions undistorted by market imperfections), on the right.
Both psychologists and economists are seeking a comprehensive
picture of risk. Economists do not assume or insist that risk be
evaluated in the purely quantitative terms of the magnitude and
probability of adverse health consequences. Economists are just as
interested in the intangible, qualitative attributes of risk that may influence public values and utility and hence expressed WTP and
WTA. Moreover, economists are interested in the conditions necessary for the public’s revealed valuations to reflect the public’s true
preferences, unbiased by market barriers such as incomplete information and high transaction costs. In other words, risk valuation in
efficient market settings would more accurately reflect true public
utility than does observed risk valuation in inefficient market setting
where workers and consumers have impaired choices. If present
markets in which risk valuations are revealed do not exhibit full information and mobility, we can imagine a “reconstituted” market in
which observed risk valuations are “efficient.” This is the normative
premise of the right-hand column below.
The point of this table is that although the ostensibly “public”
(psychometric) and “expert” (economic) approaches to risk have
been posed as adversaries, in reality there is a great deal of commonality between them – not necessarily in the descriptions they offer of
currently observed risk evaluations, but in the normative criteria they
offer for the expression of ideal risk evaluations. A progressive republic seeking to develop a normative thesis of ideal risk evaluation
could try to reconcile these two approaches (with certain caveats,
such as the need to address the lurking xenophobia in
43. Some preference-shaping role for government may be inescapable, insofar as government defines and enforces the terms of market arrangements, rights, and other features of life
that influence private endowments, options, and expressed preferences.
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“dread/unfamiliarity”). Such a reconciliation would help clarify the
conditions under which observed or elicited risk evaluations by the
public could be worthy of adherence by public officials. It also would
help public officials target their efforts toward bringing about these
conditions – full information, choice, low transaction costs, cooperation, and so on – which would in and of itself facilitate the improved
resolution of risk issues throughout society. It would also help government exercise considered judgment in its preference-shaping role,
by articulating a reconstituted ideal toward which risk policy might
progress.
Table 1. Toward a Common Normative Basis for Risk Perception and Risk Valuation
Parameters of Complete Risk Perception

Conditions for Efficient Risk Valuation

No factual errors

Full information

No heuristic errors

Accurate decision making; low costs of
information processing

Account for involuntary vs. Voluntary
risk

Full mobility, choice (Or, treat as part of
cost analysis – degrees of involuntariness
reflect relative costs of risk avoidance)

Account for dread, unfamiliar risk

Account for quality of life concerns (But:
may also be proxy for prejudice, xenophobia)

Account for loss aversion – the preference for “old” or “natural” risks over
“new” or “unnatural” risks (to the extent
that these are not heuristic errors)

Account for the observation that the
Willingness to Accept (WTA) price to
incur a new risk (lose a current health
asset) may exceed the willingness to pay
(WTP) to remove an equivalent existing
risk (gain an equivalent new health asset). This may reflect income effects associated with different initial endowments, or it may reflect the implicit costs
of initially acquiring the health asset or
an equivalent asset; or other factors
(perhaps heuristic errors)

Consider benefits of the risky activity
(“opportunity” as well as “danger”)

Consider the compensating wage/price
differentials and other utility gains for
incurring the risk (based on full information, mobility); consider costs avoiding
the risk

Trust in institutions

No free riders or rent-seeking
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VI. MOVING FORWARD
One conference will not resolve how risks are best handled in
the republic. But our discussions, and the papers in this symposium
issue, suggest several central observations. First, risk comparisons
are inescapable – not just to set priorities among independent risks,
but because many risks are interrelated and policy actions to reduce
one risk will induce increases in other risks. Sound risk policy therefore requires weighing risk versus risk.
Second, political bodies facing multiple demands on scarce risk
protection resources are going to employ some version of CRA notwithstanding its limitations. The problem is that these political bodies may employ dysfunctional approaches to setting priorities, by
making implicit and ill-considered choices that disguise tradeoffs and
serve political power rather than social well-being, or by making
needlessly mechanical comparisons of purely quantitative data. In
the interests of both democratic and rational decision-making, analysts need to assist these governments to do the best job of CRA they
can. This includes taking account of the salient qualitative aspects of
risk. One avenue to explore in this regard is the use of the Willingness to Sacrifice (WTS) to measure the qualitative attributes of risk.
In these ways, expert analysis can support democratic, transparent
and intelligent public policy.
Third, explaining the divergence between “expert” and “public”
approaches to risk is more complex than has previously been claimed.
It is not just that experts are merely quantitative while the public has
a “richer” qualitative appreciation of risk. It may be that some of the
public’s views are factually and heuristically erroneous. And it may
be that the economic experts are actually listening to the public more
attentively than are the psychometric experts – or that both are listening, in different and complimentary ways. There appear to be two
approaches to eliciting and interpreting public evaluations, not one expert approach and one public approach.
Fourth, even assuming that public risk evaluations do reflect a
“richer” appreciation of the qualitative attributes of risk, it is wrong
to leap from this positive observation to the normative conclusion
that a democratic republic should automatically incorporate these
44
public attitudes into regulatory policy. Good government – even in
44. The normative goal might be to make risk regulation “efficient” in the sense of maximizing social well-being. Critics argue that current risk regulation does not maximize social
well-being, because current regulations target many quantitatively small risks and thus miss
more cost-effective opportunities to maximize the number of lives saved (or life-years saved).
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its representative function – may need both to supplement austere
quantitative measures of risk with contextual qualitative judgment,
and to filter out public prejudice and intolerance. In sum, government should not just react to numbers or to public attitudes, but
should work with both experts and citizens to select appropriate rationales for prioritizing and regulating risk. Government should
prompt citizens to question and reflect upon the qualitative attributes
of risk. And government, experts, and citizens should fashion a normative vision of the conditions for ideal risk evaluation and ideal risk
regulation, reconciling the psychometric approach to risk perceptions
with the economic approach to risk valuation. If we could agree on
what constitutes a legitimate expression of public evaluations of risk,
unadulterated by market imperfections, heuristic errors, and invidious intolerance, we could make much progress on translating both
expert and public evaluations into law and policy.

See BREYER, supra note 4; Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of
Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS AND LIVES SAVED 167 (Robert
W. Hahn, ed., 1996). Defenders of current risk regulation may counter that it does maximize
social well-being once qualitative values are taken into account. See, e.g. M. Granger Morgan,
Quantitative Risk Ranking: More Promise than the Critics Suggest, in WORST THINGS FIRST?,
supra note 2, at 133, 137-38 (describing the contention that current risk priorities are ideal once
qualitative factors are considered). Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic
Analysis of Crime,—J. LEGAL STUD. – (forthcoming 1998) (criminal law, even if it does not
minimize the number of crimes, might be efficient once one takes account of the social meanings (i.e. qualitative attributes) of the condemnatory messages expressed in criminal laws).
Certainly optimal risk regulation would maximize the social value of risk reduction, not
just the number of lives saved. But the claim that this is already the situation again confronts
the problem of nonfalsifiability. See supra note 41 (on potential nonfalsifiability of interest
group theory of regulation). It would be too easy to assert that whatever pattern of risk regulation emerges must be socially efficient because it reflects unmeasurable qualitative values.
Any regulatory pattern could be explained on this basis, inferring the relevant qualitative attributes in hindsight. On this account, the status quo would always be the best of all possible
regulatory worlds. Thus, a more tractable and predictive identification of qualitative attributes,
and one that allows the possibility of other explanatory factors for observed regulatory priorities (e.g. heuristic errors and interest group rent-seeking), is needed to address this question.
Moreover, even if qualitative attributes – the values of the social meaning of risk – do in
fact explain observed regulatory outcomes, this positivist claim does not necessarily warrant the
normative conclusion that these qualitative attributes are the proper basis for regulation. Public values may at times be venal, vengeful, or xenophobic. See Frank Cross’s essay in this symposium issue. Hence a more coherent normative synthesis is needed to distinguish majoritarian
risk regulation from socially ideal risk regulation.

